网络外部性下传统码头与自动化码头的博弈

Game between traditional terminals and automated terminals under network externality

为研究不同网络外部性下传统码头与自动化码头的博弈问题,建立基于网络外部性和码头服务质量的Hotelling模型,使用Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈得出两种码头的最优定价、市场需求和市场收益这3个变量值。结果表明:在Stackelberg博弈下传统码头和自动化码头的这3个变量值均大于在Nash博弈下的这3个变量值。在码头服务质量差异化不变时,传统码头的市场需求与边际成本呈正相关,自动化码头的市场需求与边际成本呈负相关。在自动化码头网络外部性较小时,传统码头应提升自身服务质量;在自动化码头网络外部性较大时,传统码头不应提升自身服务质量。网络外部性使码头在选择定价时有更多空间,不再仅受码头位置和服务质量的影响。

In order to study the game issue of traditional terminals and automated terminals under different network externalities,the Hotelling model based on network externalities and terminal service quality is established.The values of three variables,the optimal pricing,market demand and market return,of the two kinds of terminals are obtained by Nash game and Stackelberg game.The results show that the values of the three variables of traditional terminals and automated terminals in Stackelberg game are all larger than those in Nash game.When the terminal service quality difference is invariable,the market demand of traditional terminals is positively correlated with the marginal cost,while the market demand of automated terminals is negatively correlated with the marginal cost.If the network externality of automated terminals is smaller,the traditional terminals should enhance their service quality;if not,the traditional terminals should not enhance their service quality.The network externality makes terminals have more space in the choice of pricing and is not only influenced by terminal location and service quality.