“印证理论”的表象与实质——以事实认定为视角

Representation and Substance of Corroboration Theory: from the Perspective of Fact-finding

"印证理论"的核心命题"印证是证明模式(方法)",是对印证属性的错误界定,进一步造成与自由心证、证明标准等相关概念的淆乱。究其实质,印证既非证明模式,亦非证明标准,而是一种证据分析方法,也可作为一种证据审查判断方法。印证从证据直接跨越到事实,未通过法律推理、诉讼认识论等裁判机制建立并证立二者之间的联系。裁判者片面依据印证来择选适用证据、认定事实的做法有违合法律性,并缺乏正当性。印证低估了事实认定的复杂性,亦无法充足证据裁判主义的要求。"证据互相印证"的效果既不能充足证据的真实性,也不必然意味着高的证明力,更不等同于证明标准已达成、证明负担被卸除。尽管融合了"心证"的因素,但"印证理论"仍过于强调并追求证明标准的具体化与客观化,否定事实认定标准的主观性,拒斥裁判主体的主体性。

The core proposition of corroboration theory,namely“corroboration is the mode/method of proof”,is an erroneous and misleading definition that causes confusions about such legal concepts as intime conviction and standard of proof.In fact,corroboration is not a mode or way of proof,but rather a method of evidentiary analysis,or a way of evidence review and evaluation.Corroboration theory cuts off the relationship between the evidence and the fact,which might trigger disputes over both legality and legitimacy.The effect of“evidence of evidence”does not guarantee the authenticity of the evidence,nor does it necessarily mean high proof.It does not even mean that the standard of evidence is satisfied or the burden of proof is released.Despite the integration of intime conviction,corroboration biasedly emphasizes objectiveness of judicial proof and denies the fact that the nature of judicial proof rests on the subjective aspect of fact-finding process and the fact-finders’subjectivity.