基于契约理论的直接能源交易动态激励机制设计

Design of contract theory based dynamic incentive mechanism for direct energy trading

在小型发电场电网中,直接能源交易能够在减少输电线路损耗的同时,获得能源交易收益。针对小型电力供应商和电力消费者交易双方的需求自私性和信息非对称性,提出一种基于契约理论的动态激励机制。考虑能源间歇性以及电能高峰时段输电成本多变的特点,在建立电能消费者和小型电能供应商模型基础上,研究两阶段直接能源交易动态激励机制,在满足小型电能供应商激励相容约束和参与约束的前提下,通过甄别小型电能供应商真实的成本信息,使电能消费者获得最大的期望效用。实验结果表明,电能消费者与发电效率高、输电环境好的小型电能供应商签订长期契约能获得较高的期望效用。

The direct energy trading is a promising approach to simultaneously achieve trading benefits and reduce transmission line losses in small-scale power generation grid.A dynamic incentive mechanism based on contract theory is proposed to balance the selfish requirement and asymmetric information between small-scale electricity supplier and electricity consumer.Considering the characteristics of energy intermittency and variable power transmission cost in peak period,the dynamic incentive mechanism of two-period direct energy trading is studied on the basis of the establishment of electricity consumer and small-scale electricity supplier model.On the premise of satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint and participation constraint of small-scale electricity supplier,the true cost information of small-scale electricity supplier is discriminated to make the electricity consumer get maximum expected utility.The experimental results show that the long-term contract signed by electricity consumer and small-scale electricity supplier with high power generation efficiency and perfect power transmission environment can obtain the optimal expected utility.