基于三方博弈的我国地方债务问题研究

Research on China's Local Debt Problem based on the Three Party Game Theory

地方债务问题的产生不仅有历史原因,同时也有制度原因。从经济学的角度出发,地方政府、中央政府和银行在地方债务问题中都可以看作是理性人,为了实现自身的利益最大化,各自带着效用函数进入博弈。因此,地方债务目前的现状是三方不断博弈的结果。文章基于博弈论角度构建了地方政府与中央政府静态模型和动态模型,得出了地方政府过度举债概率与中央政府的监管力度成反比关系。但是在中央政府要保持经济增长态势时,地方政府会认为中央政府的加强监管威胁不成立,进而会继续过度举债。此外,文章从地方政府和银行的博弈分析中得出了地方债务不断提高的原因:中央政府作为最后的兜底人,不允许地方政府破产,会导致银行倾向于将资金借贷给地方政府以及激励地方政府获得更多贷款,进而导致地方政府贷款不断增多,地方债务不断提高。

The emergence of local debt is not only for historical reasons,but also for institutional reasons.From the perspective of economics,local governments,central governments and banks can be regarded as rational people in the local debt problem.In order to maximize their own interests,they all bring utility function launch to the game.Therefore,the current situation of local debt is the result of the continuous game between the three parties.This paper based on the game theory to constructs a static model and a dynamic model between local government and central government,and concludes that the excessive borrowing probability of local governments and the supervision by the central government have inversely proportional relation.But when the central government wants to maintain economic growth,the local governments will think that the central government's threat of tightening supervision is not valid and will continue to borrow excessively.Furthermore,this paper concludes the reasons for the continuous increase of local debt from the game analysis of local governments and banks:the central government as the last resort does not allow local governments to go bankrupt,which will lead to banks tend to lend money to local governments and encourage local governments to obtain more loans,lead to an increasing number of local government loans and the local debt increasing.