投资者—国家争端解决机制的革新与国家的“回归”

The Reformation of ISDS Mechanism and the Return of the State

国家的"离开"是各国解决国际投资争端的基本特点,表现为程序方面投资者—国家仲裁逐渐取代了传统的外交保护,实体待遇方面某些条款的模糊性将国家缔约权让与了私人主导的投资仲裁庭。在构建投资者—国家仲裁机制时,理论上认为该机制的唯一功能在于解决争端,但据此构建的制度框架无法匹配国际司法机关的多重功能。仲裁造法、裁决不一致以及限制国家管制权等现象日益突出,使得各国普遍质疑现行投资者—国家仲裁机制的妥当性。欧盟拟创设的投资法院体系模式代表了国际投资争端解决的新趋势,体现了国家在投资争端解决程序和实体待遇方面正在寻求"回归"。认识国际司法机关的多功能性、承认国际司法机关的司法造法可能性,并且利用缔约方的政治立法权限制国际司法机关的司法造法,有助于构建更适当的国际投资争端解决机制。

The departure of states works as a basic feature for international investment dispute settlement among states,which manifests that ISDS is in place of traditional diplomatic protection on procedural side and private-controlled investment tribunal acquires the treaty-making power owned by contracting states previously as a result of vagueness of investment treaty clauses.In the process of building-up of ISDS mechanism,uni-functional orientation for dispute settlement and ensuing institutional framework are unable to match the reality which international courts behave multi-functionally.Arbitral law-making,inconsistent awards and imposed limits to state power come to the front,which present chances for stakeholders to challenge current ISDS,especially about its legitimacy and legality.Investment Court System pattern initiated by EU signifies a new tendency relating to investment dispute settlement,which indicates states are seeking for return to investment dispute settlement procedure and the drawing up of more restrictivesubstantive treatments offered to investors.Knowing the multi-functionality behaved by international courts,acknowledging arbitral law-making possibility and setting up limits to arbitral law-making through contracting parties political-legislative law-making are beneficial to structure a more suitable mechanism for investment dispute settlement.