孟德斯鸠与卢梭设计权利的概念张力以及哲人政治的共同困境

Theoretical Tension in Montesquieu and Rousseau's Design of Right and Fate of Philosophor's Politics

孟德斯鸠和卢梭的政治哲学从两个方向为大革命的制度设计提供了理论和资源。孟德斯鸠对权力和人性的不信任,使得他所设计的民主制度更多偏向于权力与权利的制衡。在孟德斯鸠看来,民主制度之程序的稳定运行和自我持存已经殊为不易,而追求"极端平等"的政治冲动则将导致民主制度的失败。但是,卢梭却并不满足于这种有限的民主及其正义结果。卢梭所预期的民主制度不仅要达到分权与制衡的目标,更要成为抵抗"极端不平等"所导致的权利异化的力量。卢梭基于社会契约所设计的民主制度与他在《政治经济学》中所提出的"人民经济学"紧密结合,这与他的启蒙理念一起成为法国大革命前后最受推崇的实践指导。但是,二者用以设计民主政体的历史条件和思想质料最终都在大革命之后的资本主义社会秩序中走向其理论的极限。

Montesquieu and Rousseau s political ideology provided the theory and resources for the design of the revolutionary system in alternative directions.Montesquieu s distrust of power and human nature made his democratic system more biased towards power and rights.In his view,the stable operation of the system of democracy is difficult,and the pursuit of“extreme equality”will lead to failure of democracy.But Rousseau is not satisfied with this limited democracy and its just results.His expectation of democracy is not only to achieve the result of decentralization and balances,but also to resist the“extreme inequality”caused by alienation of right.His democratic system,designed by social contract,is closely integrated with his“people s economics”in his Discourse on Political Economy,which,together with his enlightenment philosophy,became the most respected practice guide before and after the French Revolution.However,the historical conditions and ideological material they used to design the democratic system have ultimately reached its limit in the capitalist social order after the Revolution.