宅基地征收中“钉子户”与地方政府行为分析

Behavior Analysis of “Holdout”and Local Government in Rural Residential Land Expropriation

在宅基地征收过程中,通常会出现一少部分"钉子户"通过拖延或阻止地方政府征收获得更高的补偿价格。强势的地方政府能够有效地阻吓"钉子户"的抵制行为。当地方政府不能够区分"钉子户"和"非钉子户"时,"钉子户"的抵制行为能够提高"非钉子户"获得的补偿价格;反之,则不存在"钉子户"为"非钉子户"提供的外部正效应,而地方政府会因此征收更多数量的宅基地,以获得更高的收益,但农户的整体收益会减少。

In homestead collection,some“Holdout”people usually exist who may obtain higher compensation prices by delaying or preventing local government acquisition.Strong local governments can effectively deter the Holdout s boycott.When local governments cannot distinguish between“nail households”and“non-nail households,”the boycott behavior of“Holdout”can increase the compensation price for“non Holdout”;otherwise,there would be no positive external effects on the“non Holdout”made by the“Holdout”,local governments could collect more homestead land and obtain higher returns with the decrease of farmers overall income.