全面侵华时期日军的对华持久战战略

Japanese Army's Protracted War Strategy towards China during Its Total Invasion to China

第一次世界大战后,日军开始加强对持久战、总体战战略的研究,在理论与制度上进行准备。《帝国国防方针》确定,日军战争战略以速决战为优先,同时兼顾持久战,以美苏为主要假想敌,将中国排序于其后,并据此确定了对华军事部署。卢沟桥事变后,日军希冀以有限的兵力实现速决战目标,其间虽亦制定了对华持久战规划,但出于对战争前景的乐观预期,日军对自身军事进攻与政治诱降的效果做出误判,无法下定实行战略收缩以减少消耗的决心。因此日军持久战计划多次让位于其"速决"投机,在投机失败后,又不得不因形势的变化而调整迭代,缺乏政策稳定性,其原因是日军对中国军民抗战能力与决心的低估。

Influenced by World War One,the Japanese Army studied the protracted war strategy and made some preparations in theories and systems.The“Imperial National Defense Policy”had determined that the Japanese Army s total war strategy was to give priority to get quick victory,while at the same time taking into account a protracted war.In the overall strategy of the Japanese Army,the United States and the Soviet Union were regarded as the main imaginary enemies,and it obviously underestimated the Chinese anti-Japanese forces in military deployment,lacking certainty in related plans.As a result,after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident,there appeared disputes within the Japanese Army around the Protracted War towards China.In the later practices of war,the Japanese Army misjudged the expected effects of military“quick victory”and political inducements for several times,and when Japan was forced to adopt a protracted war,it could not make up its mind to implement strategic contraction to reduce consumption.The Japanese Army s protracted war strategic plan underestimated Chinese army and people s abilities and determinations to fight against Japan,resulting in its passive adjustments due to repeated failures in its predictions.This paper intends to examine the evolution of this strategy.