上市公司非效率创新投资测度——来自中部六省的经验证据

Research on Measurement of Inefficiency Innovation Investment of Listed Companies: Empirical Evidence from Six Central Provinces

融资约束和代理成本可能导致企业非效率创新投资问题。通过构建一个异质性双边随机边界模型,本文利用中部六省数据,从企业的融资约束和代理成本两个方面定量考察上市公司非效率创新投资的偏离方向和程度。结果表明:整体上,对上市公司非效率创新投资的影响,融资约束的下偏效应强于代理成本的上偏效应,净效应表现为创新投资不足;上市公司非效率创新投资的异质性较强,相比较,中央国有企业创新投资不足情况较弱,地方国有企业创新投资不足情况最严重,另外,民营企业创新的"信贷歧视"并未显著改善;大规模公司创新投资不足的程度呈下降趋势,小规模公司创新投资不足的程度有逐渐加重的倾向。因此,应进一步改革金融体制,降低外部银行信贷对民营企业和小规模公司创新的融资约束;降低中央国有企业的代理成本,以避免创新投资过度。

Financing constraints and agency costs may lead to inefficient innovation investment of enterprises.By con-structing a two-tier heterogeneity stochastic frontier model,this paper quantitatively examines the deviation direction and degree of inefficient innovation investment of listed companies based on the data of six central provinces from financing constraints and agency costs.The results show that:overall,the lower bias effect of financing constraints is stronger than the higher bias effect of agency costs on the inefficient innovation investment of listed companies,and the net effect is that the innovation investment is insufficient;the heterogeneity of corporate innovation investment is strong,compared with private enterprises,underinvestment of central state-owned enterprises is weak,the shortage of innovation invest-ment in local state-owned enterprises is the most serious,and the“credit discrimination”of private enterprise innovation has not been improved significantly;the degree of underinvestment in large-scale corporate innovation is declining,and the degree of underinvestment in innovation by small-scale companies tends to increase gradually.Therefore,we should reform financial system to reduce the financing constraints of external bank credit on R&D of private enterprises and small-scale enterprises,and reduce the agency costs of central state-owned enterprises so as to avoid excessive investment in innovation.