合作金融组织剩余控制权安排的另一种可能——分权型及半阁村实例

Alternative Arrangement for the Residual Control Rights in Cooperative Financial Organizations——The Risk Matching Model and the Case of Bange Village

除由发起人集中负责实施剩余控制权的发起人控制模式之外,合作金融组织剩余控制权安排还存在另一种可能——分权型模式,即根据风险与权利对应原则由成员采取分散化方式来实施剩余控制权。本文提出一个合作金融组织剩余控制权安排的分析框架,并在该框架下实证分析半阁村信诚农村信用互助专业合作社剩余控制权的分配与实施过程及其特点,初步验证了分权型模式的内在逻辑,即分权型模式可以根据入股情况在成员中间分配剩余控制权,通过明确和具体的成员担保机制来分散化实施剩余控制权。分权型模式的理论启示在于其揭示了剩余控制权实施存在非唯一性的可能。最后从剩余控制权"可分"的角度对当前合作金融组织实践与政策领域存在的一些问题进行反思并提出相关建议。

In addition to the sponsor control model in which the sponsors are responsible for exercising the remaining control rights,there exists another possibility for the arrangement of residual control rights of cooperative financial organizations,in which the residual control rights are implemented by the members according to the principle of risks and rights correspondence(referred to as the decentralized model).Under a framework of the allocation and implementation of residual control rights of cooperative financial organizations,this paper empirically analyzes the arrangement of residual control rights of Xincheng Rural Credit Mutual Help Professional Cooperative of Bange Village and its characteristics.This paper initially verifies the logical feasibility of the decentralized model,that is,the decentralized model can allocate residual control rights among the members based on equity participation,and decentralize the implementation of residual control rights through the member guarantee mechanisms which should be explicit and specific.The theoretical significance of the decentralized model is that it reveals more than one option exists for the implementation of residual control rights.At the end,the paper reflects on existing problems in the practice and policy about cooperative financial organizations and puts forward pertinent suggestions from the perspective of the“divisibility”of residual control rights.