论我国中央银行制度的进一步完善

On the Further Improvement of China's Central Banking System

自20世纪70年代以来,发达经济体中央银行在治理通货膨胀过程中赢得了声誉,中央银行独立性明显上升。2008年国际金融危机以后,中央银行职能进一步加强。中国经济进入新时代,必然要求我国中央银行制度与时俱进。本文认为,我国中央银行有必要在国家治理体系中更好地体现运作上的独立性。在职能进一步丰富和强化过程中,中央银行要加强内部治理机制建设,完善价格型货币政策调控,通过建立短期操作目标利率,使得"双轨制"利率并轨,并由货币政策委员会来决定政策利率。本文提出我国建立有决策权力的货币政策委员会制度有两种可选方案:一是由现行的货币政策委员会在改变人员构成后升级而来;二是在国务院金融稳定发展委员会框架下,恢复人民银行曾经建立的理事会制度,下设货币政策委员会专门研究决定政策利率和货币政策操作事宜。

China's economy has entered a new era,and that requires her central banking system to keep pace with the times.This paper argues that it is necessary for China s central bank to better reflect its operational independence in the national governance system.To further enrich and strengthen its functions,People's Bank of China should strengthen the internal governance mechanism,improve the interest rate-based monetary policy framework,integrate interest rate system through the establishment of short-term operating target interest rate,and empower the monetary policy committee to determine the policy rate.The author holds that there are two schemes for the establis hment of a monetary policy committee system with decision-making power in China:one is to upgrade the existing monetary policy committee after changing its personnel composition;the other is to restore the board system established by the People s Bank of China under the framework of the Financial Stability and Development Committee of the State Council and to set up a monetary policy committee.