实在论的容易论证中关于指称的默认假设

The Easy Argument for Realism and Its Assumption about the Referential Feature of TermsThe Easy Argument for Realism and Its Assumption about the Referential Feature of Terms

最近流行的关于有争议实体存在的容易论证,其论证步骤中要用到存在概括,但存在概括要求在相应指称位置上的词项有真实的指称。然而,在通常的容易论证中,相应的词项有指称是被默认的。在本文中,通过强调一种普遍存在的语言现象,这个默认假设将被质疑。为回应这个质疑,容易论证的支持者要么就得事先论证更强的形而上学断定或其他非语义学断定,从而使容易论证不再是容易的,要么就只能简单地断定这个有理由被质疑的假设成立,从而使论证失去其看起来有或被相信有的力量。重要的是,容易论证的支持者不能以援引他们在论证中运用的使用条件来避免陷入这种二难困境,因为使用条件的满足,无论在概念上,还是在事实上,都不能保证这个默认假设是真的。

The Easy Argument for abstract entities in recent literature takes existential generalization as a step of its reasoning;this step requires the term in question to be the real reference.In typical easy arguments,it is simply assumed as unproblematic that the requirement is satisfied.This paper will call the assumption into question.On the one hand,while there is plausible reason to doubt the assumption,using it in the argument without any convincing proof will undermine the validity of the argument;on the other hand,an easy argument will no longer be easy when pursuing any substantial non-linguistic support for the assumption.Furthermore,the application conditions which the easy argument depends on cannot help advocates of the argument out of their dilemma insofar as the application conditions fail to conceptually or factually guarantee the truth of the assumption.