双重股权结构对非效率投资的影响研究

The Effects of Dual-Class Share Structures on Inefficient Investment

股权结构是公司治理的基础,不同的股权结构影响公司的投资行为,从而影响公司的价值。然而没有哪一种股权结构是完善无缺的,正是出于对其利弊的权衡考量,国内资本市场逐渐开始接纳双重股权结构公司。因此,对双重股权结构公司的进一步研究和探讨应合了国内资本市场实践推进的需要。本文以2008-2017年中国在美国的上市公司为样本,对比分析双重股权结构和单一股权结构公司在投资效率上的差异,以及两类公司管理层持股比例对非效率投资的影响差异。研究结果表明,两类公司普遍存在非效率投资问题,相比单一股权结构公司,双重股权结构的公司更多地表现为过度投资;通过检验两类公司管理层持股对投资的影响发现,与单一股权结构公司相比,双重股权结构公司管理层投票权比例对非效率投资的促进作用更显著,管理层现金流权比例对非效率投资的抑制作用也更显著,而其两权分离程度越大,表现出来的非效率投资行为越严重;针对表现为过度投资的样本进行检验也表现出同样的结果,即双重股权结构公司管理层投票权对过度投资的促进作用、现金流权和两权分离程度对过度投资的抑制作用都较单一股权结构公司更明显。本研究视角独特、样本新颖、过程直观,希望能对问题的进一步探讨及公司治理、市场监管提供有益的参考。

Ownership structure is the basis of corporate governance,so different ownership structure affects investment behavior and even the value of company.However,no ownership structure is perfect.it is out of consideration of its ad?vantages and disadvantages that the domestic capital market has gradually begun to accept dual-class share structures companies.Therefore,the further study and discussion of these companies meet the needs of domestic capital market practice.The paper compares and analyses the difference of investment efficiency between dual-class share structure companies and the single ones which were listed in U??S??based on the samples of them from 2008 to 2017,and the difference of managerial shareholding ratio of two types of companies on inefficient investment.Research shows both types of companies have problem of non-efficiency investment,and the dual-class share structures companies show the behav?ior of overinvestment compared with the single one;by examining the impact of managerial shareholding on investment in two types of companies,it finds compared with single-class share structure companies,improving the cash flow rights of management shareholders would contribute more to restrain the non-efficiency investment(overinvestment)in dualclass share structures companies,as the extent of voting rights and separation increasing,the non-efficiency investment(overinvestment)would be promoted more,and the greater the degree of separation of ownership and control,the more serious the inefficient investment behavior is;the same result is also shown for the samples of overinvestment,that is,the promotion effect of management voting rights on overinvestment,the restraint effect of cash flow rights and the degree of separation of the two rights on overinvestment are more obvious than that of single ownership structure company.This study has a unique perspective,novel samples and intuitive process,hoping to provide useful reference for further discus?sion of the problem and corporate governance,market supervision.