高管薪酬影响审计质量吗?

Does Executive Compensation Affect the Quality of Auditing?

以2009～2016年我国上市公司大样本数据为研究对象,对高管薪酬与审计质量的关系进行了实证分析。研究发现,高管薪酬提高使得企业获得非标准审计意见的可能性升高,审计费用增多,雇用"四大"会计师事务所的概率提高,这表明高管薪酬对审计质量有正向影响;而考虑产权性质之后,发现在国有企业中高管薪酬与审计质量之间正相关性相对较弱。研究结论表明:高管薪酬的增加能够对审计质量起到促进作用。在公司治理中要适当提高高管薪酬,提升审计质量;建立完整的审计监管体系,避免高管和审计师的合谋问题,优化公司治理;国有企业中,高管薪酬和审计质量存在正相关性,可以从高管薪酬和审计质量的关系入手,处理国有企业高管薪酬现存的评价考核问题。

This paper takes the large sample data of listed companies in China from 2009 to 2016 as the research object,and empirically analyzes the relationship between executive compensation and audit quality.Studies show that the increase in executive compensation has increased the likelihood of companies obtaining non-standard audit opinions,the increase in audit fees and the increased probability of hiring four major accounting firms,indicating that executive compensation has a positive impact on audit quality.After considering the nature of property rights,it finds that the positive correlation between executive compensation and audit quality in state-owned enterprises is relatively weak.This paper re-screens the substitution variables of audit quality.The research conclusions provide suggestions for enterprises to improve audit quality and corporate governance level,which can be used as a reference for China salary reform.