P2P网贷平台违规经营及政府监管的机会主义行为演化博弈分析

基于演化博弈理论,分别建立了不完全信息P2P网贷平台之间以及P2P网贷平台与地方政府之间演化博弈的动态复制系统,分析了P2P网贷平台的违规经营行为以及地方政府监管过程中的机会主义行为,同时讨论了不同情形下系统的演化稳定状态。研究表明:在理性经济人的条件下,P2P网贷平台和地方政府都会发生机会主义行为;中央政府对P2P网贷平台的动态管理,不仅能够改善P2P平台违规经营和地方政府监管不断波动的不确定性状况,而且可以降低平台违规和地方政府弱监管行为的可能性。据此提出以下建议:提升P2P网贷行业的自律水平;针对地方政府官员设计科学合理的激励与约束机制;中央政府应设置专门的监管机构,依据P2P平台的经营行为来采取动态惩罚或扶持政策。

Based on the evolutionary game theory,this paper establishes the dynamic replication system of evolution games between P2P network loan platforms with incomplete information and between P2P network loan platforms and local governments respectively,and analyzes the illegal operation behaviors of P2P network loan platform and the opportunistic behaviors in the process of local government supervision.Meanwhile,it discusses the evolution and stability of the system under different circumstances.The research shows that,under the condition of rational economic man,both P2P lending platforms and local governments will have opportunistic behaviors.Moreover,the dynamic management of P2P lending platforms by the central government can not only improve the uncertain situation of illegal operation of P2P platforms and fluctuating supervision by local governments,but also reduce the possibility of platform violations and weak supervision by local governments.Therefore,this paper puts forward the suggestions that the self-discipline level of the P2P online lending industry should be improved,a scientific and reasonable incentive and restraint mechanism for local government officials should be designed,and the central government should set up a special regulatory agency to take dynamic penalties based on the P2P platform’s operating behaviors or support policies.