基于竞争视角下央地政府环境规制行为策略研究

Research on environmental regulatory behavior strategy of central government and local government under the perspective of competition

鉴于"经济分权,政治集权"的管理模式下,地方政府在执行环境规制过程中与中央政府目标不一致这一现象,本文考虑了相邻地方政府投资环境保护行为的正外部效应与投资经济行为的负外部效应对中央政府和地方政府环境规制选择策略的影响;运用演化博弈理论构建了相邻地方政府竞争视角下中央政府与地方政府的演化博弈模型,探讨了博弈双方的演化规律及行为特征;进一步结合理论分析,选取数值对奖励力度、惩罚力度、相邻地方政府投资环境保护的正外部效应系数及投资经济行为的负外部效应系数对博弈主体实现稳定演化策略的作用机制进行仿真,并对博弈双方实现演化稳定策略的动态轨迹进行分析,研究影响因素如何促进博弈主体实现博弈均衡。研究表明:(1)中央政府和地方政府的环境规制意愿对各影响因素的敏感性存在较大差异,地方政府的环境规制执行意愿对奖励力度、相邻地方政府竞争产生的正负外部效应更为敏感,中央政府和地方政府对惩罚力度均有较强的敏感性。(2)奖励力度、惩罚力度和相邻地方政府不同投资行为产生的正、负外部效应系数对实现环境规制理想局面的影响均存在门槛效应,只有在一定条件下,当相邻地方政府投资行为的正负外部效应低于阈值或奖励力度、惩罚力度超过阈值时,有利于促进中央政府和地方政府实现(执行,不监管)的理想局面。相对于投资经济行为的负外部效应,有效控制投资环境保护行为的正外部效应更易于促进地方政府选择执行环境规制策略。中央政府在绩效考核体系中应充分运用相邻地方政府竞争机制和奖励机制对环境规制博弈双方的影响差异,制定有效措施激励地方政府积极执行环境规制。

In view of the‘economic decentralization,political centralization’management model,the purpose of local governments are inconsistent with the central government’s objectives in in implementation of environmental regulation.This paper discussed impact of the positive externalities of investment in environmental protection of neighboring local governments and negative external effects of investment economic behaviors on environmental regulation choices of central government and local governments.The evolutionary game theory was used to construct the evolutionary game model between the central government and local government from the perspective of the competition of the neighboring local governments.Furthermore,the evolutionary rules and behavioral characteristics of the two sides of the game were discussed.In addition with theoretical analysis,we selected numerical values for incentives,penalties,positive externality coefficients of investment in local environmental protection for neighboring local governments and negative external effect coefficients for investment economic behaviors to simulate the action mechanism of game players to achieve a stable evolutionary strategy.Based on the dynamic trajectory analysis of the evolutionary stability strategies achieved by the two sides of the game,it analyzed how influencing factors promoted the game players to achieve game equilibrium.The research showed that:First,there was a large difference in the sensitivity of the central government and the local government’s willingness to implement environmental regulation for various influencing factors.Local governments’willingness to implement environmental regulations was more sensitive to factors such as reward,positive and negative external effects of neighboring local governments’different investment behaviors.The central government and local governments had strong sensitivity to punishment.Second,there was a threshold effect on the ideal equilibrium of game players,which was generated by the factors including reward,the positive and negative external effects of neighboring local governments’different investment behaviors.Only under certain conditions,when the positive and negative external effects of neighboring local government investment behaviors were lower than the threshold or the strength of incentives and penalties exceeded the threshold,the central government and local governments would be promoted to achieve the ideal situation(perform,not regulate).Compared with the negative external effects of investment economic behavior,it was easier to effectively control the positive external effects of the investment environment to promote local governments to choose the strategy of implement environmental regulation.In performance of appraisal system,the central government were supposed to make full use of the differences in the influence of the competition mechanisms and incentive mechanisms of neighboring local governments on the environmental regulation game,and take effective measures to encourage local governments to actively implement environmental regulations.