官员激励与企业投资同群效应

Officials' Incentives and the Peer Effect of Corporate Investment

本文选择沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,基于同群效应的分析视角对企业投资行为进行研究,并考察地方政府官员激励在这一过程中发挥的作用,研究发现:中国上市公司在投资过程中具有与行业投资一般水平保持一致的跟随型同群效应特征,但是这种投资特征会受到地方政府官员激励的深刻影响;官员激励越强,企业投资跟随型同群效应越弱。进一步研究表明,官员激励加剧了企业投资向行业最高水平趋近的追赶型同群效应,进而导致企业的投资过度。这一现象出现的资源基础在于官员激励较强地区的企业获得了更多的信贷配给。

Based on selects samples of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share stock markets,this paper studies the investment behavior of enterprises by the approach of peer effects,and examines the role played by local government officials in this process.The result shows that China’s listed companies show a following-type peer effect that getting close to the general level of the industry,but this effect is affected by the officials’incentives.The stronger officials’incentive is,the weaker company’s following-type investment peer effect is.Further study shows that officials’incentives exacerbated the catch-up-type peer effect of enterprise investment in the industry,leading to excessive investment in the enterprise level,the reason of this phenomenon lies in the firms in the areas where officials’incentive are high obtained more credit rationing.