供给侧改革下的政府规制与企业的标准化行为演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Governmental Regulation and Standardization Behavior of Enterprises under Supply-side Reform

在供给侧改革的背景下,企业标准化生产是促进产业转型和提升产业竞争力的重要路径,政府行为在企业标准化活动中发挥无可取代的作用。从推动企业标准化活动的角度出发构建了政府规制—企业标准化行为的演化博弈模型,探究政府规制策略与企业标准化行为的动态演化过程及均衡稳定策略,分析影响两者博弈过程的相关因素。博弈结果发现:从企业的角度来看,标准化成本、产权损失风险及联盟收益等都是对企业标准化策略产生影响;从政府的角度来看,政府获得的税收增加及规模经济效益都将促使政府选择规制标准化策略;而从政企双方的互动角度来看,政府在企业标准化过程中的奖励力度和惩罚措施对双方的博弈发挥着关键的影响作用。

Under the background of supply-side reform,standardized production of enterprises is an important path to promote industrial restructuring and enhance industrial competitiveness.Governmental behavior plays an irreplaceable role in the standardization of enterprises.This paper constructed an evolutionary game model of government support-enterprise standardization from the perspective of promoting enterprise standardization activities,studying the dynamic evolution process and equilibrium stability strategy of government support strategy and enterprise standardization behavior and analyzes the influence of the relevant factors of the two game processes.From the perspective of the enterprise,standardization costs,risks of loss of property rights and alliance benefits,all have an impact on the corporate standardization strategy.From the government’s point of view,the incremental tax revenue and economies of scale will encourage the government to choose to support the standardization strategy.From the perspective of the interaction between government and enterprises,the government’s rewards and penalties in the process of enterprise standardization play a key role in the game between the two parties.