市场竞争加剧是否助推国有企业加杠杆

Whether Market Competition Increasing Boosts the Leverage of SOEs

防范化解重大风险的重点在于防控金融风险,而结构性去杠杆则是防控金融风险的主要抓手,其中国有企业去杠杆被提上国家战略高度。本文基于拓展的理论模型及1998—2007年中国制造业国有企业数据,从市场竞争视角探讨国有企业高杠杆的可能成因。理论推导得知,在市场竞争加剧的背景下,银行对国有企业的软预算约束会推高国有企业杠杆率;以外资管制放松政策为准自然实验的DID模型分析表明,外资管制放松使得国有企业杠杆率显著提高,进一步分析表明该政策效应不具有经济基本面支撑且违背了市场规律,原因在于银行对国有企业实行软预算约束进而实现对国有低效率企业的保护,不利于国有企业中僵尸企业的退出。政府在深化国有企业改革并推动国有企业去杠杆时应遵循市场经济规律和企业发展规律,在扩大对外开放的同时应加快国内体制改革的进程,更多地让市场机制实现"优胜劣汰"。

The focus of defusing major risks lies on controlling financial risks,and structural deleveraging is the main task of controlling financial risks.The deleveraging of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)has been promoted to the height of national strategy.The paper intends to investigate the possible cause of SOEs’high leverage in the perspective of market competition both with an extended theoretical model and Chinese SOE-level panel data over the period 1998-2007.The theoretical model shows that the soft budget constraint of banks on SOEs will promote the SOEs’leverage in the condition of intensifying market competition.The results of DID model based on FDI deregulation reveal that FDI deregulation leads to a rise in the leverage of SOEs.Further analysis shows that the policy effect is not supported by economic fundamentals and also violates the market laws,it would be attributed to the protection for the SOEs from the government and banks which is not conducive to the exit of state-owned zombie firms.Government should follow the market laws and the law of firm development when deepening the reform and deleveraging of SOEs,and should also speed up the process of domestic institution reform when expand the opening-up,to realize the“survival of the fittest”by more market mechanisms.