征管独立性与税收收入增长——来自国税局长异地交流的证据

Agency Independence and Tax Revenue Growth:Evidence from the Rotation of NTBs' Directors in China

征管效率的提升是促进税收收入增长的重要因素,但已有研究并未明确征管效率变化的微观机制。本文以中国国税系统自1998年起实施的国税局长异地交流制度为背景,从征管独立性的角度探究了征管效率提升的微观基础,并进一步考察其对宏观税收收入增长的影响。基于1998—2010年间中国省级层面的分税种税收收入数据,实证研究发现,税务机关独立性的提升显著促进了税收收入的增长,相比于国税局长由本地晋升的地区,拥有异地交流国税局长的地区税收收入增长更快。进一步地,从区分税种的维度来看,征管独立性的提升存在明显的作用边界,对所得税和消费税等征收自由裁量权较大的税种促进作用较为明显,而对增值税征管效率的提升则并不显著。此外,在所有制维度,相较于来自国有企业和集体企业的税收收入,征管独立性的提升对私营企业税收收入的提升也更为显著。本文的研究对我国现行税收征管体制的改革具有重要的政策含义。

Although tax collection efficiency is an important factor affecting the growth of tax revenue,there is little research to explore the micro channels that lead to the improvement of collection efficiency.In this paper,we provide a supplement for the existing literature by understanding tax collection efficiency from the angle of agency independence.We examine the impact of changes in the independence of taxation on tax revenues,against the background of the rotation of directors of the National Tax Bureaus(NTB)that began to be implemented in the Chinese National Tax System in 1998.The study proves that the increase in the independence of the tax authorities significantly promoted the growth of tax revenues.Further,regarding different taxes,the improved independence of tax administration has a clear function boundary;it has a notable effect in promoting the collection of the taxes involving relatively high discretionary powers such as income tax and consumption tax whereas its effect upon the efficiency of VAT collection is insignificant.In addition,in the dimension of the enterprise ownership,the improvement of agency independence has a more significant effect on the increase of tax revenue from private enterprises than that from state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises.This research has important policy implications for future reform of the tax collection system.