供给侧结构性改革背景下企业的退出与进入:政府和市场的作用

Exit and Entry of Firms from the Perspective of Supply-side Structural Reform: The Roles of the Government and the Market

当前中国经济进入新常态,部分行业产能过剩,新兴产业供给不足,供给侧结构性改革势在必行,如何有效实现产业结构转型升级是亟待解决的重大问题。基于期权博弈理论,本文构建理论模型分析了从垄断到完全竞争等一系列不同市场结构下,企业退出与进入市场的最优策略,以及相应的市场均衡和产业发展模式,并且深入探讨了政府与市场在其中扮演的"角色"及两者的协同效应。具体结论如下:(1)市场风险加剧了企业退出与进入的难度,并对相应成本有"放大"作用。(2)政府的产业政策应随市场情况而定,与市场协同发挥作用。当市场风险较大时,政府通过调节市场风险更为有效,尤其在短期。而在长期,调节退出与进入成本以及企业淘汰率相对更加有效。(3)本文对不同情形下,产业政策所需的时间、产生的效果、产业演化过程进行了模拟,为供给侧改革背景下产业政策量化评估和精准实施提供了依据。

Currently,China s economy has stepped into a new normal status,wherein overcapacity poses a serious challenge in some industries,many zombie firms exist,and the supply of strategic emerging industries is insufficient.This makes supply-side structural reform imperative.How to effectively achieve the transformation and upgrading of the industrial structure is a major problem that remains to be solved.The modest scale and exit mechanism of industries are important issues for supply-side structural reforms.The key is to solve the coordination problem of the government and the market from the supply-side perspective.This requires the government to consider the role of the market in formulating policies and sets a higher bar for the accuracy and evaluation mechanism of the policies.However,our theoretically understanding of the synergistic effects between the government and the market in improving the industrial structure is limited and no study offers a theoretical and practical micro-mechanism for the exit behavior of firms.The theoretical framework and numerical analysis under this hybrid mechanism are important issues for ensuring that the macroeconomy is stable and that industrial policies are accurate.This paper focuses on firms optimal decision and the number of firms in the industry and discusses synergy between the government and the market.By allowing firms to exit,we build a dynamic equilibrium model based on real option game theory,extending the framework of Pindyck(2009)and Bustamante&Donangelo(2017).Firms can freely enter the industry by paying a sunk cost,while incumbent firms can pay another cost to exit when market conditions deteriorate.Without loss of generality,firms can produce any amount of a homogeneous product as they want at a constant marginal cost.We assume a Nash-Cournot competition structure for firms in the industry.The market demand curve shifts unpredictably and is regarded as market risk.All firms have idiosyncratic ongoing fixed costs and face the risk of failure.The theoretical model in this paper provides the optimal strategies for firms exit and entry decisions under various industrial structures,from monopoly to perfect competition.Based on the theoretical model,the following conclusions are drawn.(1)Market risk exacerbates the difficulty of firms exit and entry decisions and can magnify the corresponding exit and entry costs.(2)The government s industrial policies should be formulated according to market conditions.When the market risk is high,it is more effective to adjust the market risk,especially in the short run.However,in the long run,adjusting exit and entry costs and firms failure rate is relatively more effective.(3)Through Monte Carlo simulation,we solve for the time needed for industrial policies to take effect,the process of industrial evolution,and the endogenous mechanism underlying the industrial policies under specific conditions.This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways.First,based on real option game theory,this paper includes the case of firms optimal exit strategy when there are a small number of firms in the industry.This provides a unified theoretical framework of market equilibrium and industrial development including both exit and entry for both small and large number of firms.This is an extension of the relevant theoretical literature.Second,from the supply-side perspective,this paper explores deeply the roles of the government and the market and synergies between them in guiding the exit of surplus overcapacity and entry into strategic emerging industries.We also discuss how the government can formulate effective industrial policies depending on the market conditions.Therefore,we provide the theoretical and practical micro-mechanism for firms' exit and entry decisions,which offers a feasible way for implementing supply-side structural reform.Third,we examine the process of industrial evolution under specific conditions and the endogenous mechanism behind industrial policies,which provides the government with a tool to assess industrial policies intuitively and quantitatively and answers how to implement industrial policies more accurately.This paper gives a theoretical foundation for industrial policy formulation.