摘要
在基准信任博弈实验基础上,引入外生奖惩机制,考察奖惩机制对被试信任和值得信任行为的影响.实验发现,外生奖励机制的引入显著降低了被试的信任程度;外生惩罚机制的引入不影响被试的信任和值得信任程度,但破坏了双方在信任行为上的双向正面互动,改变了博弈双方决策行为的内在动机;被试选择奖励(惩罚),将提高(降低)其值得信任程度,但对对方下一期的信任行为不产生影响.
On the basis of the baseline trust game experiment,the paper applies the exogenous incentive mechanisms to inspect the effects on the subjects trust and trustworthy behaviors.The experiment shows that the introduction of exogenous reward mechanism reduces the degree of subjects trust significantly.The introduction of exogenous punishment mechanism has no effect on the trust and trustworthy degree of participants,but it damages the interaction of trust and trustworthy behaviors between both subjects,and changes their intrinsic motivation on decision-making behavior.The experiment also find that the subjects choices of accepting reward(punishment)will improve(reduce)the degree of trustworthy,but it will affect its counterparts’next-term’s trust behavior.
作者
陈颖
刘建华
CHEN Ying;LIU Jianhua(School of Mathematics and Statistics,Wuyi University,Wuyishan 354300,China;Business School,Minnan Normal University,Zhangzhou 363000,China)
出处
《湖北文理学院学报》
2018年第11期5-11,共7页
Journal of Hubei University of Arts and Science
关键词
信任博弈
奖惩机制
外生性
实验
trust game
rewards and punishment mechanism
exogeneity
experiment