基于进化博弈理论的建筑工程质量监管SD模型

System Dynamics Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Quality Supervision of Building Construction

组织是实现工程质量目标的关键因素。为了提升施工阶段工程质量监管效率和效果,运用进化博弈理论和系统动力学方法,研究建设单位、监理单位和施工单位三方的相互影响。基于工程质量监管过程中多方参与且复杂动态博弈的现象,构建基于进化博弈理论的系统动力学模型。借助计算机仿真分析和数学求解,找出博弈方程的均衡点和分析外部变量(监管成本、奖惩力度)造成系统动力学模型波动的原因,确定影响模型稳定性的关键外部因素,并提出有针对性的改进措施。研究表明,建设单位奖惩力度和监管成本对施工单位的质量行为有较大影响,在监理单位和施工单位存在现实勾结的情况下会导致监理单位监管失效,通过设立监管资金池等措施可以提高工程质量监管水平。

Organization is a critical factor to realize the quality objective of construction.To improve the efficiency and effect of engineering quality supervision,this paper proposes a system dynamics(SD)model based on evolutionary game theory to explore complicated dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders,including the project owner(PO),construction supervision engineering(CSE)and construction contractor(CC).Moreover,by means of computer simulation analysis and mathematical solution,equilibrium points of game equations were found and the reason that external variables(supervision cost,the degree of punishment and reward)caused the SD model to fluctuate was analyzed.Then,the critical external factors influencing the stability of SD model were identified and some specific improvement measures were proposed.It can be concluded that the degree of punishment and reward and supervision cost of the PO have a great effect on CC’s quality behaviour.The CSE fails to regulate when it colludes with the CC.Furthermore,quality supervision can be greatly improved by taking measures such as establishing funds especially for punishment and reward.