卖空机制与审计收费——基于双重差分模型的实证检验

The Short-Selling Mechanism and Audit Fees——An Examination Based on DID Model

我国引进融资融券制度是完善证券市场的重要举措。本文采用DID双重差分模型以及配对样本,考察了卖空机制对审计收费的影响。研究发现,卖空机制的引入使得融券标的企业的审计收费有所提高;分析师跟踪人数越多,融券标的企业的审计收费提高程度会越弱;当股权结构适度集中时,这种"提价效应"会消失。此外,本文还考察了卖空机制对异常审计收费的影响。

A margin trading system is essential to a developed stock market.Taking advantage of the system's introduction to our country,this paper will use the DID model and matched samples to analyze the relationship between the short-selling mechanism and audit fees.The study finds that:the short-selling mechanism has increased the audit fees of margin trading target enterprises.But when more analysts are following a company,the price-increasing effect will be reduced.When there is an appropriate concentration of ownership,the price-increasing effect will disappear.In addition,this paper also examines the impact of the short-selling mechanism on abnormal audit fees.