基于激励相容视角的“毒跑道”事件安全监管分析

Analysis of the Safety Supervision Static Game of the Toxic Runway Incident from the Perspective of Incentive Compatibility

针对校园"毒跑道"事件,从激励相容视角切入在分析学校跑道安全监管主要相关主体的性质及决策过程的基础上,分别构建地方政府和地方监管部门、地方监管部门和跑道建设企业的博弈模型;根据模型分析结果,对不同主体实现激励相容的关键要素和关键参数进行了识别和计算,得出针对地方监管部门和跑道建设企业的激励相容约束。结果表明,地方政府实现对地方监管部门激励相容的关键点在于奖惩力度;对跑道建设企业实现激励相容的关键在于学校寻求监管意愿以及地方监管部门的监管准确水平。最后对结论进行推广,从奖惩机制、监管意愿以及技术水平三个方面提出了产品安全监管激励相容设计的建议。

The toxic runway incident was the result of incentive incompatibility among local government,local regulators and runway construction companies.This paper analyzed the decision-making process of the campus runway safety supervision from the perspective of incentive compatibility.Based on this theory,the paper firstly built a three parties’supervision game model,then verified the incentive effects of the local regulators and runway construction companies according to the model,and figured out the reasons of the incentive incompatibility among the relevant stakeholders during the construction.The results suggest that the reward and punishment systems,schools’desire to seek regulation and technology level all have positive effects on the incentive compatibility.Based on the calculations,advices are promoted based on these three aspects.