基于多阶段动态组合拍卖的联盟舱位分配研究

Capacity Allocation in Airline Alliances Based on Research on Multi-stage Dynamic Combinatorial Auction

收益分配方式的不同决定了航空公司对于不同航段舱位的认知价值不同,承运航空公司决定是否承运,不在于市场航空公司所接收到旅客请求票价的高低,而在于它所能分配到的收益的多少,收益分配方式的不同会影响舱位分配的优化结果。本文抛弃了原有先确定收益分配方式再进行舱位分配的模式,以航空公司对航段舱位自身的认知价值进行舱位分配。将联盟看作拍卖者,各航空公司作为竞拍者,联盟航线上的舱位看作商品,建立基于多阶段动态组合拍卖的航空联盟舱位分配模型,得到航空联盟收益最大化下的舱位分配,算例分析表明,该方法可解决航空联盟内各航空公司在不同航段上的舱位分配问题,具有实用性与创新性。

The different sharing proportion of revenue for operating airline determined the different value of O-D,and the operating airline decided to receive a ticket or the marking airline depends on the revenue sharing proportion instead of the ticket fare. So the optimizing of seat allocation depends on the revenue sharing mechanism.The paper abandons the original pattern and the airlines allocate their seat capacity according to the seats’ own value. Regarding the airline alliance as the auctioneer and seat capacity in an itinerary as lots, we establish the model of multi-stage dynamic combinatorial auction to allocate the seat capacity and get the maximize revenue of airline alliance. The numerical studies reveal solve the problem of the seat capacity allocation,which is practical and innovative.