摘要
兼容性标准在现代经济的分工协作运行中具有重要影响,但市场机制有时无法有效地实现标准化。分析标准化的理论基础以及标准设定组织的协商过程和机制,建立动态混合策略博弈模型,探讨通过标准设定组织方式建立兼容性标准的利弊,并与标准竞争方式进行比较。研究表明,与标准竞争相比,由标准设定组织中介的协商方式形成兼容性标准的可能性更高。时间成本对于协商效率有正面影响,引入退出机制也可以提升协商效率。此外,标准设定组织可能引发垄断与反垄断问题,其组织性质可能异化为托拉斯组织,参与协商的企业可能滥用私有知识产权,实施垄断性行为。为了实施有效的市场竞争规制政策,监管机构需将此纳入反垄断考量。
Compatibility and standards play crucial roles in modern economy,however,market mechanism is not very efficient for standardization.This article investigates benefits and drawbacks of standard setting organizations(SSOs),and comparing it to standard competition.First,we analyze the economic foundation for standardization,and negotiation mechanism of SSOs.Then we build a dynamic mixed strategy game model,to study the negotiation process of SSOs.Our study shows that SSOs negotiation mechanism could greatly improve success rate of compatible standards.Besides,increasing of time value,or incorporating exiting mechanism could improve the efficiency of negotiation.Moreover,there are also antitrust considerations for SSOs.It may provide a platform for collusion.Furthermore,standard essential patents in a formal technique standard might lead to patent holdup,and its holder may conduct monopolistic practices.
出处
《产经评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第6期34-45,共12页
Industrial Economic Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“网络外部性产业的兼容性演化路径与政府引导策略研究”(项目编号:71503056,项目负责人:马键)
国家留学基金委国家公派访问学者项目(项目编号:201608440100).
关键词
标准设定组织
兼容性标准
协商机制
协同效率
反垄断
standard setting organization
compatibility standard
negotiation mechanism
coordination efficiency
antitrust