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演化博弈视角下PPP防控地方政府债务风险研究

Research on Prevention and Control of Local Government Debt Risk via PPP from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory
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摘要 演化博弈理论是博弈论和动态演化过程的结合,参与人均为有限理性。构建不完全信息下PPP项目参与方地位不对称的风险分担博弈模型,建立合理有效的PPP风险分担机制,通过"机制找回效率",提升债务资金配置效率,防范地方政府债务风险。因此,地方政府应优化PPP合约及规制体系设计,构建PPP风险管控机制,鼓励社会资本参与,提升公共投资效率,同时要改善政治环境。 Evolutionary game theory is the one that combinesgame theory and dynamic evolutionary processbased on the premise that all theparticipantshave bounded rationality.In this paper,a risk sharing game model is built based on the status inequality of PPP project participantsunder incomplete information,and thusa reasonable as well as effective risk sharing mechanism of PPP is established.By doing this,the efficiency of debt funds allocation can be improved,and local government debt risk can beprevented.Therefore,it is suggested that the local government should optimize the PPP contract and design of regulation system,construct the risk control mechanism via PPP project,encourage social capital input,improve the efficiency of public investmentas well asthe political environment at the same time.
作者 彭金道 PENG Jin-dao(Division of Supervision and Auditing,Tongling College,Tongling 244000,China)
出处 《安徽商贸职业技术学院学报》 2018年第4期36-39,共4页 Journal of Anhui Business College
基金 安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSK11-12D334)
关键词 PPP项目 债务风险 演化博弈 风险管控机制 PPP(Public-Private-Partnership)project debt risk evolutionary game risk control mechanism
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