中国式政府竞争、地方环境治理与企业避税

Chinese Government Competition,Local Environmental Governance and Corporate Tax Avoidance

为了解决绩效考核指标带来的激励扭曲问题,自党的十八大以来,中央政府加强了对地方政府的环境治理绩效考核重视程度。地方政府的环境治理政策可能会通过影响企业避税的方式影响居民福利。地方环境治理政策力度的提高可能会改变企业避税的边际收益和边际成本,从而增加企业的避税程度。利用我国规模以上工业企业数据库,研究地级市环境治理政策对企业避税程度的影响,发现地方政府环境治理程度的增加显著提高了企业的避税程度,降低了企业实际税率。因此,在我国进行官员绩效考核改革时要充分考虑对地方政府和企业的影响。在增加环境治理程度时,应加强对企业税收征管的监督力度,提高企业的纳税遵从度,降低对企业避税和实际税率的影响。

In order to solve incentive distortionproblems caused by performance appraisal indicators,since the 18th National Congress of the CPC,the central government has strengthened its attention to the performance appraisal of environmental governance of local governments.The environmental governance policy of local governments may affect the welfare of residents through the way of tax avoidance.The improvement of local environmental governance policy may change the marginal revenue and marginal cost of tax avoidance,thus increasing the degree of tax avoidance of enterprises.This paper empirically studies the impact of environmental governance policies on tax avoidance in prefecture-level cities by using databases of industrial enterprises above the scale of our country.It is found that the increase of environmental governance of local governments significantly increases tax avoidance of enterprises and reduces the actual tax rate of enterprises.Therefore,we should fully consider the impact of reform on local governments and enterprises when we reform the performance appraisal reform of officials in our country.When increasing the degree of environmental governance,we should strengthen the supervision on enterprise tax collection and management,improve enterprise tax compliance,and reduce the impact on tax avoidance and actual tax rate.