基于演化博弈模型的医联体双向转诊机制策略

Analysis on the strategy of two-way referral mechanism of medical alliance based on evolutionary game model

为切实提高医疗资源的使用效率,缓解医疗资源分布不均等问题,基于演化博弈模型,动态分析医联体内部核心医院与成员医院间的演变趋势与博弈均衡。医联体双向转诊机制实施效果与补贴、医保报销力度、资源配置有关,而利益同向和资源互补关系最为密切。准确把握双向转诊的利益生成逻辑与资源互补逻辑,并借助科技、立法、制度杠杆进行优化,把握核心机制,切实发挥医联体双向转诊机制的本质属性。

This study aimed to improve the use efficiency of medical resources and alleviate the uneven distribution of medical resources,study the operation mechanism of two-way referral in the model of medical alliance,so as to promote the rational distribution of medical resources and improve the use efficiency of medical resources.Based on the evolutionary game model,we dynamically analyzed the evolution trend and the game equilibrium between the core hospitals and the member hospitals.The effect of two-way referral mechanism was closely related to government subsidies,medical insurance reimbursement,resource allocation and bilateral interests.We should accurately seize the benefit generation logic and resource complementarity logic of two-way referral,and optimize with the help of science and technology,legislation,system leverage and multi-angle,grasp the core mechanism,and give full play to the essential attribute of the two-way referral mechanism of medical alliance.