一个基于双向声誉机制的网络平台重复信任博弈模型

A game model of repeated trust based on two-way reputation mechanism for network platform

网络平台的机制设计直接影响交易者的行为决策和平台的健康发展.本文根据网络平台的特征,将Laureti的互联网交易机制模型中的信誉评价由买方对卖方的单方面评价扩展到交易双方的互评,并对两阶段信任博弈模型进行了拓展,构建了一个基于声誉机制的重复信任博弈模型,更好地解释了网络平台交易双方行为产生的动因和网络平台信任机制的动态演化过程.通过模型分析得出结论:有效的声誉机制会促进参与者信任度的提高;网络平台只要能提供给参与者有效的历史信息,并建立起声誉机制,则不论是有限次的博弈还是无限次的博弈,参与者都将选择信任,且信任的程度与声誉机制的具体参数密切相关.

The mechanism design of the network platform directly affects the behavior decision of the trader and the healthy development of the network platform.According to the characteristics of the network platform,this paper extends the reputation evaluation of Laureti′s Internet trading mechanism model from the buyer′s unilateral evaluation of the seller to the mutual evaluations between the two parties,and extends the two-stage trust game model as well.The paper constructs a repeated trust game model based on reputation mechanism to further explain the motivation of the both parties′behavior and the trust mechanism′s dynamic evolution of the network platform.Through the analysis of the model,the conclusions are as follows:An effective reputation mechanism does promote the trust degree of the participants.As long as the network platform can provide the participants with some effective historical information and establish a reputation mechanism,the participants will choose trust whether the game is limited or infinite.And the research conclusion also shows that the trust degree is closely related to the specific parameters of reputation mechanism.