企业税收筹划影响高管薪酬契约吗?

Does the Tax Planning Affect the Executive's Compensation Contract?

近年来高管薪酬-业绩倒挂现象突出,使得高管薪酬契约的有效性问题受到广泛关注。本文基于税收筹划的视角,考察了税收筹划对高管薪酬契约的影响。以2007—2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,税收筹划程度越高的企业,其薪酬-业绩敏感性越高;并且税收筹划对高管薪酬契约的影响在民营企业和非四大审计的样本中更为明显。本文的研究结论有助于增进我们对如何完善管理者薪酬契约这一问题的认识。

In recent years, the phenomenon of executive pay-performance inversion has been prominent, which has caused widespread concern about the effectiveness of executive?s compensation contracts. This article examines the impact of tax planning on executive?s compensation contracts based on tax planning perspectives. Based on China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016,we find that the higher the level of tax planning, the higher the sensitivity of pay-performance. Further tests find that the impact of tax planning on executive's compensation contracts varies among companies in different corporate governance levels. Specifical- ly, the impact of tax planning on the sensitivity of executive pay-performance is more pronounced in private companies and non-Big 4 audit firms. The research findings of this article will help us to increase our understanding of how to improve the manager?s compensation contract.