浅析招标投标项目中标人与招标人的博弈——以工程施工项目为例

Analysis on the Game Between the Winner Bidder and the Tenderer of Tendering and Bidding Projects——Taking Engineering Construction Project as an Example

论文通过博弈模型分析了招标投标项目中标人与招标人的利益关系。结论是:违约金越高,监管成本越小,中标人保质保量完成工程项目的概率就越大;违约金越低,中标人偷工减料获得的利润越大,招标人监管的概率越大。政策建议是:健全工程施工项目中标后的监管制度,加大对违约行为的惩罚;建立投标人诚信档案和加强行业自律。

The paper analyzes the interest relationship between the winner bidder and the tenderer through the game model. The conclusion is that the higher the liquidated damages are, the lower the supervision cost is, the higher the probability of the successful bidder completing the project with quality and quantity is. The lower the penalty for the breach of contract, the greater the profit of the winning bidder who cut corners, and greater the probability of the tenderer's supervision. Policy recommendations are to improve the supervision system after winning the bid for construction projects, to increase penalties for breaches of contract, to establish good faith files of bidders and to strengthen industry self-discipline.