环境规制与资源型企业绿色行为选择:“倒逼转型”还是“规制俘获”

Environmental Regulation and Green Behavior Choice of Resource-Based Enterprises: “ Reverse Transformation” or “Regulation Capture”

资源型企业绿色行为选择,除承担转型调整成本外,还面临高昂的沉没成本。为避免陷入"资源优势陷阱",政府试图通过环境规制来约束企业的负外部性行为。通过构建环保监管部门与企业的双方动态博弈模型,并将绿色声誉对二者行为的约束、得益引入模型,探究环境规制能否诱导资源型企业的绿色行为选择。研究发现:精心制定的环境规制能触发企业绿色行为选择,但资源实际控制者环保监管部门与企业间易出现"规制俘获";声誉机制透过政府公信力损失与得益,媒体披露影响力度与利益相关者态度,可有效约束监管部门被"俘获"行为,遏制企业寻租的可能性,间接倒逼待转型企业绿色行为选择;企业违规处罚力度的增加,在倒逼其绿色行为选择的同时,也降低了监管部门被寻租的机会。

In addition to the adjustment cost,the resource-based enterprises”green behavior choice may also be faced with high sunk costs.In order to avoid falling into the “resource advantage trap”,the government tries to restrain the negative externalities of regulated enterprises through strict environmental regulation.Through building a dynamic game model between the environmental regulatory authorities and the resourcebased enterprises and introducing the green reputation to the environmental supervision department and the enterprise behavior restriction,benefit into the model,the paper explores whether environmental regulation can effectively control environmental pollution and induce resource-based enterprises to choose green behavior.The study shows that thestrict environmental regulations may trigger enterprises to choose green behaviors,but the “ regulation capture”occurs between the environmental supervision department and the resource-based enterprises.Through government credibility loss and benefits,the influence of media disclosure and the attitude of the stakeholders,the reputation mechanism may effectively restrain the “capture of regulation”and curb the possibility of rentseeking by enterprises and then the choice of green behavior in the resourcebased enterprises is forced indirectly.The increase of illegal punishment of the resourcebased enterprises has reduced the opportunity of rentseeking of the supervision department while forcing enterprises adopting green behaviors.