核边缘、信号博弈与小国的“自我孤立”悖论

Nuclear Brinkmanship,Signaling Games and the Paradox of Small State Isolation

国际关系的一个基本常识是,当小国面对某个实力远强于自己的大国的军事威胁时,小国的理性选择是维护和强化与自己盟国的关系。但在某些特定条件下,小国却会在自身生存威胁最严峻的时期选择疏远与自己盟国的关系,从而使自己有可能陷入孤立无援的危险境地。文章综合运用博弈论、过程追踪和大数据等方法,揭示了这种反常现象背后的信号博弈原理:当特定条件满足时,拥有核威慑能力的小国可以通过故意破坏与其盟国的关系这种高成本策略,展示其愿意承担更大核战争风险的决心,从而增加在核边缘对抗中迫使敌对大国退让的几率。这个原理刻画并解释了一个违背国际政治基本常识的悖论:敌对大国对小国的军事威胁越大,小国越有可能疏远而非巩固与其盟国的关系。"自我孤立"悖论提示我们,联盟除了正面的延伸威慑功能外,还具备一种此前从未被注意到的负面威慑功能。

This article applies game theory,process tracing and large data methods to explain the logic behind this counter-intuitive phenomenon.The explanation found follows from the logic of the signaling game:when certain criteria are satisfied,a small state in possession of a nuclear deterrent can adopt a high cost strategy of purposely destroying its relations with its allies as a means of demonstrating its resolve to risk a nuclear conflict.In doing so,it can step closer to the brink of nuclear war as a means of increasing the likelihood that a hostile great state will be compelled to make concessions.This logic explains the following paradox in international relations theory:the greater the military threat a hostile great state presents to a small state,the more likely the small state will be to isolate itself from its allies rather than consolidating alliances.