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特朗普政府对朝新政中的“以华制朝”策略评析

An Analysis of the Trump Administration's New Strategy towards the DPRK:“Leaning on China to Sanction the DPRK”
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摘要 特朗普政府上台后,将朝鲜核问题视为美国最大的安全威胁,并根据东北亚已显著变化的局势,迅速推出了名为"极限施压与接触"的对朝新政。这一新政着眼于在预留军事打击与和平谈判选项的前提下,将对朝施压力度提升到令其难以忍受的程度,并重点通过"以华制朝"的方式,迫使中国承担起对朝施压的主要职责。为此,特朗普政府对华采取了又压又推的两手策略,在想方设法增大中国危机感的同时也辅以利益诱惑,强制进行交易,争取以较小的成本获取较大的收益。在三边博弈的背景下分析,美国政府当前的战略重心并非是想彻底解决朝核问题而是试图改善自我处境,"以华制朝"可以将中朝关系推入难以逆转的对抗状态,同时压缩朝鲜对美要价的空间,迫使其争取对美和解,从而使美国获得前所未有的有利地位。2018年后,虽然美朝关系出现显著改善而美中关系严重恶化,但由于中国在半岛问题上的作用无可替代,美国无法以美朝双边方式主导朝鲜弃核进程,"以华制朝"仍然是其无法回避的一个必由之选,并将作为特朗普政府任内对朝政策的重心而长期存在。 After the Trump Administration came into office,it began to view the DPRK nuclear issue as the greatest threat to American security.Based on changing circumstances in Northeast Asia,it rapidly introduced a new policy towards the DPRK characterized by “maximum pressure and engagement”.On the premise of reserving options of military attacks and engagement,this new policy utilizes both diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions to cause unacceptable pain for the DPRK,while stressing the role of China in sanctioning the DPRK,forcing China to bear the primary responsibility for placing pressure on the country.As the game between the three states has played out so far,the strategic focus of the U.S.government has been less the absolute elimination of the DPRK nuclear threat,but more the improvement of its own situation.The notion of “leaning on China to sanction the DPRK” can function to push China and the DPRK into a confrontational relationship that will be difficult to reverse.At the same time,this will also severely narrow the DPRK ’ s ability to make demands vis-à-vis the U.S.,thereby placing the U.S.in an unprecedented position of strategic advantage.
作者 刘卫东 Liu Weidong(Institute of American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Science)
出处 《当代亚太》 CSSCI 北大核心 2018年第6期106-132,159,159,共29页 Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies
关键词 特朗普政府 “以华制朝” 朝鲜核问题 博弈 Trump Administration Leaning on China to Sanction the DPRK DPRK Nuclear Issue Game Theory
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