基于博弈模型的P2P网络借贷行业风险机理研究

A Game-Theoretical Study of the Risks of P2P Lending Industry

互联网信息技术的进步和民间金融需求的旺盛,推动了P2P网络借贷蓬勃发展。但由于网络环境的复杂性和金融市场的波动性,也使得P2P网贷具有较高的风险。本文建立了P2P网贷市场上各主要参与主体间的博弈模型,对借款方、贷款方、平台方和监管方两两间进行了博弈分析,并结合实际案例,对P2P网贷风险行为机理进行了探究。研究结果表明,在借款方进入市场环节,借款人的申请成本和信誉成本是过滤低质量借款人的重要因素;在借贷双方借贷行为发生阶段,利率和手续费影响贷款方的出借意愿,在借款金额和利息的基础上予以一定比例的处罚和信誉损失,会影响借款方违约程度,单笔小额资金有助于缓解借款方的还款压力,提高借款方的还款信心,减少赖账行为,降低风险;监管方严格监管收益和宽松监管收益会影响监管方的监管力度和平台合规经营收益,影响平台规范化经营程度,对平台的惩罚力度和监管方转移收入,会同时影响监管方监管力度和平台规范经营程度。这些结论有望对P2P网贷市场的良性发展提供理论参考。

The advancement of information technology and the strong demand for private finance have prompted P2P network lending to flourish, but due to the complexity of the network environment and the volatility of financial markets, the risk of P2P online lending cannot be underestimated. This paper develops a game theory model of P2P lending with the main players of P2P lending, including lenders, borrowers, platforms and regulators, and then studies the risk mechanism of P2P lending with real world cases. We find that, the application costs and credential costs of borrowers are important to screen out low quality borrowers, interest rates and commission fees affect lending willing, the proportional penalties and credential deduction based on lending quantity and interest rate affect default rate of borrowers, single small quantity loans could reduce the payment pressure and increase the loan payback confidence, reduce the behaviors of loan payment refusal, thus reduce the risk. Finally, the regulatory intensity could affect the regulated operations of platforms, and the penalty on the platform and transfer income of regulators could affect the level of regulated operations. These conclusions could be useful to the development of P2P lending.