农村信贷与农业保险互动的收益分配机制——基于合作博弈Shapley值的分析

A mechanism of income apportionment for the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance: Based on Shapley value in cooperative game

农村信贷与农业保险互动是金融支农的优化模式,在此模式下,农户、信贷机构和保险公司的合作博弈不仅能提高整体收益,并且根据Shapley值分配原则,农户、信贷机构与保险公司各自的收益也能得到提高。但小规模分散经营的农户因缺乏谈判力而面临利益被瓜分的风险,进而可能会退出参与或抵制合作;为了促进合作联盟的形成与稳固,一个可行的解决思路是政府制定贷款利率优惠政策,实施保费补贴,引导发展农村经济合作组织以保证农户的收益;同时,保险公司与信贷机构通过委托代理形成合作关系,并使用Shapley值分配原则来确定代理费率并签订合约。

The cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance is an advanced important mode that finance supports agricultural modernization. Under the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance in this mode, not only the gross income, but also the income of farmers and credit institutions and insurance companies can improve with the rules of income apportionment which is based on Shapley value. However, the farmers run in small scale and dispersedly, so they are lack of negotiation force, for which the farmers face the risk that their income may be encroached. Therefore, the farmers may resist the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance. To promote the cooperation between rural credit and agricultural insurance, a good way of income apportionment viable solution is that government advocates credit institutions actualize lower loan rate, provides premium subsidy for farmers, and promotes the development of rural cooperatives. Besides, insurance companies cooperate with credit institutions by providing insurance for rural credit and delegating agricultural insurance to credit institutions. Based on Shapley value which represents the contribution to cooperative alliance, credit institutions and insurance companies come to an agreement on commission and sign a contract for it.