家庭背景与就业机会——父母的职位特征为何介入了子女在首要部门的就业竞争?

Family Background and Employment Opportunity:Why Do Parents′ Job Characteristics Intervene in the Employment Competitions of the Primary Sector?

通过对中国特殊经济制度环境及企业委托代理机制的深入考察,本文揭示了在以"国有"和"垄断"为主要特征的首要部门的就业竞争中,家庭背景等劳动者的非生产性特征发挥显著影响并造成机会不公的根源与形成机制。研究认为,劳动者父辈的职位特征在首要部门的就业竞争中能发挥影响与垄断地位无关,而应归咎于国有属性对企业委托代理机制的扭曲。基本的逻辑路径是:国有产权下剩余索取权和控制权的错配导致了公司治理结构中严重的激励不相容,所有权虚置和政策性负担直接造成剩余索取权对经理人外部约束的无效性,激励了掌握自由裁量权的经理人借助人力资本的难测性,以稀缺的高薪职位寻租来谋求合同薪酬之外的个人收益,使得父母在国有单位工作的求职者更容易获得首要部门的就业机会。基于CHIP(2013)数据的实证模型为理论假说提供了稳健的经验证据。

Taking the unique economic environment of China and the principal-agent mechanism of enterprises into consideration,this paper reveals the root cause and theoretical mechanism why the non-productive characteristics of workers such as family background play a significant role and cause unfair opportunities in the employment competitions of the primary sector which is characterized by "state-ownership" and "monopoly". This paper claims that the reason why the job characteristic of the employees′ parents can play an important role in the employment competition of the primary sector is the distortion of the principal-agent mechanism by the state-owned property instead of monopoly characteristic. The serious incentive incompatibility in corporate governance caused by the terrible mismatch of residual claim and residual control,and the invalidity of the external restriction of the residual claim to managers caused by the actual vacancy of ownership and the policy burden,attract state-owned enterprises′ managers who has discretionary power to seek personal benefit other than contractual compensation by scare and highly paid positions with the help of unpredictability of human capital,making job seekers whose parents work in state-owned sector are more likely to get employment opportunities in the primary sector.The empirical models based on CHIP(2013)provide robust empirical evidences for the theoretical hypothesis.