母子公司距离、实际活动盈余管理与公司价值

Parent-subsidiary companies' distance, real earnings management and corporate value

母子公司在地理空间和制度环境上的距离将影响契约摩擦和沟通摩擦,滋生实际活动盈余管理行为。选取1998-2013年我国A股证券市场的非金融类上市公司为研究样本,采用多元回归分析、调节效应和中介效应分析方法,检验母子公司距离、实际活动盈余管理和公司价值的关系。研究结果表明,母子公司地理空间距离和制度环境距离均与实际活动盈余管理程度呈现显著的正向关系,良好的公司治理能够负向调节母子公司距离与实际活动盈余管理的关系;另外,母子公司距离负向影响公司价值,实际活动盈余管理在母子公司距离与公司价值的关系中具有显著的中介效应。研究结论为实际活动盈余管理研究向母子公司个体层面拓展,为上市公司多元化和实际活动盈余管理经济后果的揭示提供了经验证据。

Although earnings management is one of core problems in financial accounting research,the prior literature focuses on accrual-based earnings management and pays less attention to real earnings management which is more hidden and complex than accrual-based earnings management.Moreover,the exiting literature of real earnings management often uses the listed companies as the research unit and is based on the analysis of consolidated financial statements,which potentially assumes that parent companies and subsidiary companies of the listed companies are homogeneous and leads to neglecting the distances in both geospatial and institutional environments between parent companies and subsidiary companies of the listed companies.However,contracting frictions and communication frictions are influenced by space geography distance and institutional environment distance between parent company and subsidiary companies,which gives rise to the behavior of real earnings management.On the basis of theoretical analysis,the research hypothesis is presented.This paper uses space geography distance and institutional environment distance to reflect the difference in space geography and institutional environment between parent company and su bsidiary companies.This paper selects the Chinese A-share listed and non-financial companies from 1998 to 2013 as research sample and employs multiple regression analysis,moderating effect analysis and mediating effect analysis to test whether the proposed hypothesis is true.Firstly,the relationship between parent-subsidiary companies’distance and real earnings management is examined by using multiple regression analysis.Secondly,this paper examines the moderating effect of corporate governance on parent-subsidiary distance and real earnings management by applying moderating effect analysis.Thirdly,the relationship between parent-subsidiary companies’distance and corporate value,and the mediating effect of real earnings management on the above relationship are tested by the use of multiple regression analysis and mediating effect analysis respectively.Finally,the robustness analysis is implemented to test the reliability of the empirical results by adjusting the winsorizing degree of continuous variables by using variable substitution method and expanding the scope of the samples.The results show that there is a significantly positive relationship between parent-subsidiary companies’distance and real earnings management,and good corporate governance has a negatively moderating effect on the above relationship.Furthermore,this paper also shows that parent-subsidiary companies’distance negatively affects corporate value and there is a great mediating effect of real earnings management on the relationship between parent-subsidiary companies’distance and corporate value.Diversification of the listed companies has resulted in the alienation of the parent company and subsidiaries in the geographical space and the difference of the institutional environment.These can increase the degree of information symmetry and agency costs and are more likely to breed the opportunism and adverse selection of top managers of the listed companies.This study validates the influence of parent-subsidiary companies’space geography distance and parent-subsidiary companies’institutional environment distance on the real earnings management.Moreover,this paper also finds that corporate governance can weaken the positive relationship between the parent-subsidiary distance and the real earnings management,which provides a theoretical support and a practical reference for regulating and improving the internal governance of listed companies.Therefore,to implement diversification strategy,the listed companies should take some efficient measures to improve corporate governance to alleviate the restriction on the diversification premium of the company based on the differences between the parent and subsidiary companies in the geographical space and institutional environment.