摘要
为推动我国建筑节能市场的发展,保障能耗与能效信息披露更好地发挥效果,在对相关研究梳理的基础上,首先从利益相关者的角度出发,界定了信息披露利益相关者的定义并分析其利益诉求;其次,建立了政府与公建业主的博弈模型,进行利益相关者行为的博弈分析,得出双方博弈模型的均衡点和稳定点,并提出公共建筑能耗与能效信息披露顺利进行的激励机制,从而实现我国节能建筑市场的健康发展.
In order to promote the development of the energy conservation market and ensure that energy consumption and energy efficiency information are disclosed in a better way,based on the relevant research,starting from the perspective of stakeholders,the stakeholders of information disclosure are defined and their interest demands are analysed in this paper.Then,a game model between the government and the public building owners is established,to conduct a game analysis of stakeholder behavior,draw the equilibrium and stability points of the game models of both parties,and draw conclusions.The incentive mechanism of public building energy consumption and energy efficiency information disclosure is put forward so as to realize the healthy development of energy-saving building market.
作者
金占勇
康晓辉
武朋
孙金颖
Jin Zhanyong;Kang Xiaohui;Wu Peng;Sun Jinying(School of Economics and Management Engineering,Beijing univesity of Civil Engineering and Architecture,Beijing 100044;China Institute of Architect Design,Beijing 100044)
出处
《北京建筑大学学报》
2018年第4期74-79,共6页
Journal of Beijing University of Civil Engineering and Architecture
基金
住房与城乡建设部科技计划项目(2016-R1-009)
关键词
公共建筑
建筑节能
信息披露
博弈论
public buildings
building energy efficiency
information disclosure
game theory