控制权、社会审计与高管腐败

Control Power,Social Audit and Executive Corruption

以2012—2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证分析社会审计与高管腐败之间的关系,并在此基础上探讨高管权力对其腐败行为的影响。实证结果表明:高管的强控制权是诱发腐败的重要因素,且控制权越强,高管越有可能发生腐败行为;高质量的社会审计在一定程度上能抑制高管的腐败行为,提高公司治理水平;随着控制权的增强,社会审计对腐败的治理功效会被强权高管牵制,无法发挥其应有的监管作用。因此,要遏制高管的腐败行为,必须在企业内部完善对高管权力的监督制约机制,同时要加强外部审计的治理和监管,提升注册会计师的独立性,优化企业内外部治理结构。

Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2017 as samples,this paper makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between social audit and executive corruption. On this basis,this paper discusses the influence of executive power on its induced corruption. The empirical results find that strong executive control power is one of the important factors to induce the corruption and the enhanced executives’ control power can increase the corruption. With the enhancement of control power,the effect of social audit on corruption will be held back by the powerful executives,which makes the social audit not play the desired functions of supervision in corporate governance. Therefore,it is necessary to perfect supervision and restriction mechanism of executive power in enterprises to curb executive corruption. At the same time,it is also pre-requisite to strengthen the governance and supervision of external audit,enhance the independence of certified public accountants,optimize the internal and external structure of enterprise governance.