实际控制人移民海外、异常高派现及其治理——基于代理理论的分析

The Actual Controller of Immigration Overseas,Abnormal High Cash Dividends and Its Governance:An Empirical Analysis from the Perspective of Agency Theory

基于实际控制人与中小股东利益冲突的第二类代理问题,本文分析了实际控制人移民海外对异常高派现的影响。研究发现,实际控制人移民海外强化了其利益侵占的动机,为其利益侵占提供了途径,并显著增加了异常高派现。进一步从公司治理的角度进行分析,结果表明:较高的股权制衡、独立董事较强的独立性、管理层较高的持股比例、较强的上市监管以及较高的审计质量均可以在一定程度上抑制移民海外的实际控制人的利益侵占行为。本文的研究为加强对实际控制人移民海外的监管提供了参考依据。

Based on the agency problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder,our research analyzes the effect of controlling shareholder on abnormal high cash dividends.The results show that immigrant strengthens the motivation of interest encroachment and provides the channel of interest encroachment for controlling shareholder,and thus positively related to abnormal high cash dividends.Further test shows that,higher equity balance,stronger independence of independent directors and supervise,higher ratio of management shares and high quality of audit perform a governance role on expropriation conducted by immigrated controlling shareholders.Our research provides empirical evidence on the governance of immigrated controlling shareholders.