逆向选择下农户采用可持续农业生产技术激励机制设计

Design of Incentive Mechanism for Farmers' Adoption of Sustainable Agricultural Production Technology in the Context of Adverse Selection

政府作为"公共利益"的代言人往往通过各种激励措施促进农户在农业生产中积极采用可持续生产技术,然而当政府为了激励农户积极采用可持续农业生产技术而提供补贴时,由于信息不对称,农户的逆向选择行为随之而生,进而导致政策实施效果大打折扣。基于信息经济学的理论框架,探讨克服农户采用可持续农业生产技术过程中逆向选择行为的激励机制设计。

As the spokesman of public interest,the government should promote farmers to actively apply sustainable agricultural production technology through various incentives.However,when the government encourage farmers to adopt the sustainable technologies through adoption subsidies,due to asymmetric information,adverse selection behaviors of farmers will greatly reduce the effect of policy implementation.Incentive mechanism design under adverse selection behaviors of farmers’use of sustainable production techniques is proposed based on the theoretical framework of information economics.