基于考核模式分类的公共组织绩效考核政治性研究

A Research on Public Organization Performance Appraisal Politics by Classifying the Mode of Appraisal

在对考核模式进行分类的基础上,以CNKI数据库2004至2016年间研究公共组织绩效考核政治性的文献为样本,运用内容分析和文献计量分析方法概括了绩效考核政治性的内涵、表现形式与成因。绩效考核政治性在顾客主导型绩效考核中体现为考核主体基于情绪和利益考虑抬高或者压低考核结果,在科层制主导型绩效考核中体现为上级根据特定需要纵容抬高考核结果的政治性行为,通过分配考核权力或者设计考核工具抬高考核结果。考核对象通过提供虚假绩效信息或者开展印象管理抬高考核结果存在于两种绩效考核模式中。考核主体独立性不够、利益相关者的压力、行为主体之间的信任程度低、监管难度大、考核对象赢取政绩竞争的压力是绩效考核政治性的主要成因。

The article has analyzed the concept,manifestations and its causes of public organization performance appraisal politics(PAP)through the classification of assessment models,the method of content analysis,and biometric analysis,sampling on the literature from China National Knowledge Infrastructure database between 2004 and 2016.The PAP is embodied in either customer-dominant performance appraisal or bureaucracy-dominant one.As the former one,the PAP was described that the rater raises or lowers the appraisal results according to his emotions or interest.As the later one,the PAP was defined that the superior will raise appraisal results according to specific considerations by allocating assessment power or designing assessment tools.It's necessary to point out that,the rater objects can raise appraisal results by providing false information or executing impression management.The article also has summarized the cause of PAP as the insufficient independence of raters,the pressure from related stakeholders,and low level of trust between related bodies,the difficulty in supervision,and the pressure from performance competition.