农村集体经济中的委托—代理问题与系统性制度创新

The Study of Principal-agent Relationship and Systematic Institution Innovation about the Rural Collective Economy

农村集体经济代理人经营者和村委会成员身份的叠加,引发了大量委托—代理问题和机会主义行为,同时也使得农村集体经济经营与集体资产处置的效率与风险控制受到了极大影响。通过建立理论模型,系统探讨降低农村集体经济中代理人机会主义行为的机制设计问题,并就未来农村集体经济发展的系统性制度创新,提出了建立代理人和委托人之间的利益平衡机制、建立多层次的监督机制、着力构建现代经理人制度、不断对农村集体经济发展的形态进行多方面探索和创新等的政策建议。

Owing to the superposition of rural collective economic agents as operators and members of village committees,there are a lot of principal-agent problems and opportunistic behaviors in the rural collective economy.At the same time,the efficiency and risk control of rural collective economic operation and disposal of collective assets are greatly affected.By establishing a theoretical model,this paper systematically explores the mechanism design of reducing the opportunistic behavior of agents in rural collective economy.On the basis of the systematic system innovation of rural collective economic development in the future,this paper puts forward some policy suggestions,such as establishing the interest balance mechanism between agents and principals,establishing multi-level supervision mechanism,focusing on the construction of modern manager system,and constantly exploring and innovating the form of rural collective economic development in various aspects.