标准必要专利FRAND承诺与反垄断法作用

Standards-Essential Patents' FRAND Commitment and Anti-Monopoly Law's Role

标准必要专利劫持这一领域的研究甚为混沌,一方面是学术界对此的认知见仁见智,一方面存在巨大差异的欧美两大法律体系的不同法律救济方法杂然并处,造成治丝益棼的混乱。标准必要专利实际上作为被利用的客体,既可以引起滥用市场支配地位的反竞争行为,也可以成为微观经济学意义上专利劫持的工具。FRAND既相对于标准必要专利权利人而言,也相对标准必要专利实施人而言,买方垄断与卖方垄断均在反对之列。偏颇为大忌所在,不偏不颇,允执厥中。FRAND抗辩成立的要件包括两个:一是具有市场支配地位,二是违反标准必要专利权利人的FRAND。这其实具有延伸反垄断法适用范围的作用,将滥诉和专利反向劫持均纳入其中,相当于对包括垄断高价、拒绝交易和价格歧视等滥用市场支配地位行为的总括。

The study of patent-holdup in the related areas of licensing of standards-essential patents(SEPs)has proven problematic.On the other hand,the academic community has a different opinion on this aspect.On the one hand,there are huge differences in the different legal remedies of the two major legal systems in Europe and the United States.SEPs are actually instruments encompassing various strategic uses,which lead to anti-competitive behaviors of abusing market dominance,and could also become a tool for patent-holdup in the microeconomic sense.FRAND is related to both the standard necessary patent holders and the standard essential patent implementers,both the buyer monopoly and the seller’s monopoly are its two objections.The bias is the taboo,and avoiding lean to either side is important to keep the FRAND commitment.The FRAND defense in cases of standard essential patents has two elements:one is market dominance,and the other is violating FRAND commitment from the SEP holders.This actually has the effect of extending the scope of the anti-monopoly law,not only including the abuse of litigation rights and the reverse patent holdup,but also being equivalent to the total conception of abusing of market dominance,such as monopoly high prices,refusing to deal and price discrimination.