内部人减持对企业投资效率的影响研究

Research on the Impact of Insider's Reduction on Enterprise Investment Efficiency

以2011—2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本对象,从市场迎合效应和融资约束效应的角度出发,考察了内部人减持对我国上市公司投资效率的影响。基于系统GMM的回归方法,研究结果发现:内部人减持在投资过度的情况下提高了公司的投资效率,在投资不足的情况下降低了公司的投资效率,支持了融资约束效应,不支持市场迎合效应。进一步的实证结果表明,融资约束在投资过度的情况下加强了内部人减持与公司投资效率的正相关性,在投资不足的情况下加强了内部人减持与公司投资效率的负相关性。

This paper takes the A-share listed company in China from 2011 to 2017 as the sample object to examine the impact of insider’s reduction on the investment efficiency of listed companies from the perspective of market catering effect and financing constraint effect.Based on the system GMM,the research results show that the insider’s reduction increases the investment efficiency of the company in the case of excessive investment,but reduces the investment efficiency of the company in the case of insufficient investment;it supports the financing constraint effect,but does not support the market catering effect.According to the further empirical results,financing constraints strengthen the positive correlation between insider’s reduction and the company investment efficiency in the case of excessive investment,and strengthen the negative correlation between insider’s reduction and the company investment efficiency in the case of insufficient investment.