高管薪酬、强制性变更与公司绩效

Executive Compensation,Mandatory Turnover and Corporate Performance

文章基于公司绩效的视角,选取2002-2016年中国A股上市公司数据,研究高管薪酬和强制性变更在公司治理中的共同作用,探讨强制性变更能否成为高管薪酬的补充机制。研究发现,高管薪酬和强制性变更对公司绩效均存在显著正向影响;在提高公司绩效方面,高管强制性变更只与货币薪酬、股票期权间存在替代效应。考虑产权性质后的进一步研究发现,高管强制性变更与货币薪酬、股票期权、高管持股间均存在替代效应。与非国有企业相比,国有企业的高管薪酬和强制性变更对企业绩效的正向影响减弱;国有企业的强制性变更与货币薪酬、股票期权间的替代效应减弱,但与高管持股间的替代效应增强。

From the perspective of corporate performance,this paper uses the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2002 to 2016 to study the common mechanism of executive compensation and mandatory turnover in corporate governance, and explores whether mandatory turnover can become a complementary mechanism of executive compensation.The study finds that both executive compensation and mandatory turnover have significant positive effects on corporate performance;In terms of improving corporate performance,executive mandatory turnover only has a substitution effect with monetary compensation and stock option.The further study,accounting for the nature of property,indicates that there are substitution effects between executive mandatory turnover and monetary compensation,stock option and executive stock ownership.Compared with nonstate- owned enterprises,executive compensation and mandatory turnover in state-owned enterprises have less positive effects on corporate performance.In state-owned enterprises,the substitution effects between mandatory turnover and monetary com.pensation and stock option are weakened,whereas the substitution effect between mandatory turnover and executive stock own.ership is strengthened.