媒体负面报道、内部控制与高管私有收益

Negative Media Coverage,Internal Control and Executive's Private Benefits

以往的研究更多地关注媒体外部治理的效用,忽略了媒体在公司治理中发挥作用的路径。文章从外部非正式制度的角度出发,以2009年至2016年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了媒体负面报道对高管私有收益的治理作用及其作用路径。研究发现:媒体负面报道能够显著抑制高管获取私有收益的行为;内部控制在媒体负面报道与高管私有收益之间扮演了一定的中介角色。研究结果丰富了媒体负面报道影响上市公司治理的作用路径的相关文献,有助于我们更深层次的思考外部监督机制对公司内部治理的重要作用。

In previous studies,scholars mostly words and ideas offered at the effect of media external governance,while paying little attention to the internal approach of media in corporate governance.Based on the perspective of external informal institu.tion,this paper empirically investigates the relationship between negative media coverage and executive’s private benefits by using the samples of Chinese A-share listed enterprises from 2009 to 2016.The results show that: the higher media coverage can reduce the behaviors of the executives to obtain private benefits significantly.Furthermore,the internal control plays a me.diating role between them.The paper extends our knowledge about alternatives of legal mechanism in corporate governance by investigating the role of media in corporate governance,also provides new perspectives about CEO compensation practices and supplements the literature by examining the mechanism of media coverage.